The Ivanov Report

Medvedev's Political Reforms: A Missed Opportunity?

(A slightly different version of this post was published on Russia Profile)

Political reforms introduced by then-President Putin in the aftermath of the Beslan tragedy, in September 2004, have made Russia’s democratic institutions more dependent on the Kremlin, more hospitable to the incumbency, and, ultimately, less competitive.  Unfortunately, Constitutional amendments and changes to the electoral law proposed by President Medvedev in his first state-of-the-nation address will do little to challenge this status quo. 

Without any pretense of the exhaustive analysis of Medvedev's proposals, I'd like to discuss a few controversial provisions.

1.

Medvedev’s initiative to extend the presidential term to six years and the Duma deputy terms to five years appears to be a step in the wrong direction.  Extending elected officials’ terms without imposing term limits means fewer elections.  Fewer elections mean less political competition.  It’s that simple. 

As of today, the Russian electorate is not overwhelmed with election campaigns, which, when taking place, are short and non-eventful, if not outright boring.  If nothing else, more frequent elections in Russia could help awaken the disengaged and apathetic electorate.

2.

At first glance, the suggestion to allocate one or two “fixed” Duma seats to political parties which gained 5 to 7 percent of the popular vote (just below of the current 7-percent threshold) looks quite democratic.  But here is the issue.  In the past Duma election, in December 2007, two political parties currently represented in the Duma, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and Just Russia (JR) collected 8.1 and 7.7 percent of the popular vote and were subsequently allocated 40 and 38 Duma seats, respectively.  Should Medvedev’s proposal be implemented, a political party may receive only a slightly smaller percentage of the vote than, say, JR, and yet be awarded with hardly a 1/20 fraction of JR’s Duma seats.  Won’t this create an impression that some political parties (and voters supporting them) are “less equal” than others?

If President Medvedev really wants to increase party representation in the Duma, as he claims, then the most logical solution would be to reduce the electoral threshold to 5 or even 3 percent.  Yet, without giving any explanations, Medvedev called such a measure “not necessary.”

3.

The Russian electoral law openly favors incumbent (i.e. already represented in the Duma) political parties.  Medvedev’s proposals fail to address this bias.  Take his suggestion to get rid of using monetary bonds to register for elections.  It is not that this registration will be abolished at all.  No, instead of posting monetary bonds (which is at least easy if the party has money) non-incumbent parties will now have to collect supporting signatures (two million in case of Duma elections), which is cumbersome, error-prone, and open to bureaucratic harassment.  Moreover, everyone in Russia knows that these signatures are being bought -- literally bought by professional collectors who pay cash in exchange for signatures, low-income citizens like pensioners and college students being usual "donors."

The real question to ask is why a political party in good standing has to additionally register for elections in the first place?  To level the playing ground in terms of elections, a simple process could be implemented: in the year preceding Duma election, all Russian political parties go through a process of re-registration and then proceed to the election without any further preconditions.  

4.

Medvedev's proposal to introduce mandatory term limits for the leadership of political parties seems to be simply off mark.  There are no term limits for Duma deputies, senators, governors, ministers, and heads of state corporations.  Why should then the state regulate political parties, which in essense are public entities? 

5.

It is not a secret that the balance of power in Russia is heavily shifted towards the executive branch of government.  It is therefore a good idea to give the Duma some “controlling functions” (in Medvedev’s words) over the Cabinet.  A law proposed by the President would mandate annual Cabinet reports to the Duma. 

Unfortunately, Medvedev didn’t make clear what these “controlling functions” should be and how then these annual reports should be different from the current, completely toothless, “government hours.”  The new law would only be effective if it postulated that every annual report is to be followed by the Duma vote of confidence (with a simple majority needed to force the Cabinet to resign).  Otherwise, annual government reports will rapidly morph in Prime Minister Putin’s own state-of-the-nation addresses.

The State Of Withdrawal

The cover of the November/December 2008 issue of "Foreign Affairs" catches one's eye with a headline: "Checking Russia."  The burden of checking on Russia (and figuring out how to keep it in check) fell on the shoulders of Georgetown University's Charles King ("The Five-Day War.  Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis") and the Council on Foreign Relations' Stephen Sestanovich ("What Has Moscow Done").  Both provide solid analysis of the roots of the August conflict between Russia and Georgia and ponder over the future of U.S.-Russia relations in the aftermath of the conflict.

King doesn't appear to share a popular belief that by invading Georgia and recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has condemned itself to international isolation.  He believes that there are many countries that support Russia

"...in questioning the consistency of the United States' responses to territorial conflicts around the world or the evenhandedness with which the West doles out labels such as 'democratic,' 'terrorist,' or 'rogue state.'"

King seems to be more concerned that Russia's isolation may be self-imposed.  He argues that Russia's recent actions in the Caucasus have demonstrated Moscow's "...little faith in multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe."  He adds:

" This distrust reveals something important about Russian leaders' view of global politics in general: Russian leaders believe that the existing multilateral institutions are unsubtle fronts for promoting the naked interests of the United States and its major European allies."

In Kings's opinion, the real danger is that Russia will respond to Western criticism by withdrawingl from any cooperation with the West, a pattern of Russia's behavior that King follows from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War.  He concludes his piece with the following pessimistic statement:

"Certainly, Russia's actions have distanced the country from Western institutions.  But the deeper worry is that the Kremlin and average Russians can now imagine a world in which they do not have to care." 

On the surface of things, there has been little evidence so far that King's bad dreams are coming true, as the Russian leadership, both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have flatly rejected the idea of Russia breaking up its relations with the West.  ("Self-isolation is a path to nowhere", proclaimed Medvedev in his state of the nation address; "Isolationism is absolutely not our choice", Putin told to a meeting of the Cabinet).

In an article published in October, Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, called for an immediate resumption of a "straight talk" between Moscow and Washington.  He stressed that differences in opinions shouldn't prevent both countries from cooperating on vitally important issues.

This verbal olive branch was followed by a diplomatic overture as Lavrov has announced that Russia will support an extension of the United Nations mandate (due to expire on December 31) allowing United States troops to stay in Iraq, a development that gives the Bush administration a much needed breathing space. 

(Characteristically, a Washington Post editorial -- under a tasteful headline "Rogues Gone Bust" -- has interpreted this good-will gesture as a sign of Russia's weakness.  The message of the editorial was clear: if the United States wants something from Russia, pressure must be applied.) 

And yet, the future of U.S.-Russia relations looks much bleaker than the Russian leaders' conciliatory statements  might suggest.  President Medvedev uses every opportunity to blame the United States for both fomenting the August crisis in the Caucasus and unleashing the world financial crisis.  At the same time, Medvedev doesn't fail to highlight what he considers a balanced approach to the August War demonstrated by Russia's major trading partners in Europe: France, Germany, and Italy.

Speaking at an international conference in Evian, France, Medvedev made his sympathies clear:

"Over the past two months [after the war in Georgia], we have come to see...who our friends are, and who're not."

Having hailed "brave and responsible actions" of the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, Medvedev continued:

"[I'd like to] emphasize the constructive role of the European Union in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Caucasus.  When other forces showed unwillingness or inability to do so, it was the European Union that came across as a pro-active, responsible, and...pragmatic partner."

On Wednesday, delivering his first state-of-the-nation address,  Medvedev promised to send short-range missiles to the Kaliningrad region of Russia in response to the planned deployment of U.S. anti-missile defense systems in Poland and Czech Republic.  The timing of this statement -- just hours after election of Barack Obama -- led to suggestions that Medvedev's message was intentionally unfriendly and even "provocative." 

Medvedev and Obama stand a chance to meet on the sidelines of the upcoming G20  summit in Washington on November 15.  The very fact of this meeting taking place (a possibility that Obama will refuse meeting Medvedev due to a "scheduling conflict" cannot be excluded), the body language of both leaders and their comments for the media, if any, will tell volumes about how relations between two most powerful nuclear states in the world will develop.

Although Medvedev's openly anti-American stance may turn out to be a short-term, tactical, maneuver aimed at putting pressure on the new Obama administration, another possible option would be that Russia will follow a "half-King" pattern of its relations with the "West": Russia will actively cooperate with Europe, but its relations with the United States will sink in a state of withdrawal.

 

 

   

Halloween 2008

Last year, my wife and I bought a new house.  Having moved into a new neighborhood, for the second year in a row, we truly enjoy arguably the best part of Halloween: trick-or-treating.

Our previous house stood on a busy street where only a few parents would allow their kids to go to.  Only our immediate neighbors and our children's friends used to show up at the door -- to the great grief of my wife, who, being the typical Russian woman that she is, always bought more candy than we could possibly distribute.  Unused stuff polluted the house for weeks thereafter, as our kids preferred to digest their own, hardly earned, trick-or-treating loot.

Our new house sits in a cul-de-sac in a quiet upper-middle-class neighborhood near Boston.  Last year, we were almost taken off guard by the number of trick-or-treaters who chose to ring our doorbell.  The flow of visitors fortunately stopped at the moment when my wife was emptying the very last pack of candies and we were frantically counting $1 bills to cover for the rest. 

This year, we were fully prepared.  Seven 12-ounce packs of Milky Way (three), Snickers (two), and Crunch (two).  $10 total expense.

I didn't count the number of trick-or treaters last year, but it feels like yesterday, there were more kids.  No, I'm not rushing into speculation that this increase has anything to do with the ongoing economic crisis.  But I did wonder how many moms and dads of our visitors have been already affected by the wave of layoffs in Massachusetts.

As a person working for an Internet company and as a blogger, I'm used to counting "visits." So here are the stats of my personal Halloween 2008: 11 visits, 40 kids.  Four witches, three princesses, three clowns, three soccer players, two cats, two pirates, two Spidermen, a mouse, a Devil, a soccer referee,  a Sandy from the "Grease" (my wife complimented the girl's costume and suggested to take more candy.  She did with a remark: "A good costume pays off"), a Mummy, a Star Warrior, a thief, a "Halloween costume" (whatever it means), an alien, a ghost, a "happy" (whatever it means), a cheerleader, a "living death" (whatever it means), a vampire, a Dorothy from "The Wizard of Oz", a "vampirish girl" (as explained), a sorceress, and a ghost bride (a beautiful, most likely real, bride's costume).  Also three accompanying adults: a Captain Cook, a Darth Vader, and an Elvis Presley.

As the night progressed, I had a nice feeling that for the first time in weeks, the real monsters of the world -- the Obamas, the McCains, the Sarah Palins, and the Putins -- were far-far away from me and my family.  It felt wonderful.

Why My Vote Counts

In the state of Massachusetts, where I live, voting for Republicans and not voting at all is pretty much the same thing.  The only intrigue of this year’s presidential election is whether Obama will beat McCain here by 60% to 40%, 70% to 30%, or 80% to 20%.

Massachusetts is essentially a one-party state.  It has a Democratic governor and a heavily Democratic legislature. Both of Massachusetts' U.S. Senators are Democrats and so are all of the ten members of the House of Representatives.  My Congressman, the now famous Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and a 16-year House incumbent, Barney Frank, runs in elections unopposed or faces only a ghost of a Republican opponent.

That’s why in the 2004 presidential election, I voted for George W. Bush.  Not that I was particularly fond of Bush’s policies (although I didn’t call them “disastrous” back then), but after all my years of living through the one-party rule and single-candidate elections in the Soviet Union, I wanted to send a powerful message that in me, America had acquired a principal defender of political minorities at every level.  (Bush lost the state to John Kerry by 37% to 62%).

This year, we are facing the prospect of our federal government becoming a one-party body.  Democrats are expected to gain an additional 20 seats in the House and are within striking distance from reaching the filibuster-proof majority of the Senate.  With Obama in the White House, both branches of government will have a chance to unleash an ultra-liberal run-away train.

Only the election of John McCain as president – resulting in a “split” government – can prevent that from happening.

And yet, this year, I’m going to vote for Barack Obama.

Americans, like everyone else in the world, choose their leaders based on pocketbook issues, on the “economy”.  They listen to both presidential candidates and sincerely try to figure out whose promises of prosperity they like more.  This doesn’t make any sense: the final word on economic issues in the United States belongs to Congress.  Comparing minute details of McCain’s and Obama’s tax plans is a waste of time, because Congress won’t approve either; it will come up with something completely different.  Just take a look at the initial bailout plan that U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, submitted to Congress and compare it with a monster that Congress eventually adopted.

It is in the area of foreign policy that presidents have traditionally had the upper hand over Congress, having usurped at the end the very right of the latter to declare wars.  That is why this year, I, personally, vote for president based on “foreign policy”.

I have no doubt that Obama is a damned liberal.  His idea of “spreading wealth around” makes me wary, because, statistically, I’m closer to people whose “wealth” will be spread around than to people who’d benefit from such a re-distribution.

But first things first.  I’m voting for Barack Obama, because we need to reverse the disastrous foreign policies of the Bush administration.  We need a president who will explain to the American people that “foreign policy” isn’t synonymous with “national security”, and national security isn’t synonymous with launching wars thousands miles off the American shores.  We need a president who sees the world as it is, who will build the future and not settle scores of the past.

(And if Obama will run his administration in the same efficient, disciplined way he’s been running his election campaign, then for the first time in 8 years, we may finally get a functional government, however “socialist”.)

I know that some folks in Moscow would prefer a black-and-white, good-vs.-evil, us-vs.-them Cold War clarity of a McCain presidency.  I also know of the great argument of theirs that since FDR, Russia has been better off with Republican administrations.  Is it because these folks don’t see for themselves the difference between the Soviet Union of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, and Russia of Medvedev?  Or is it because the perspective of talking to evil men like Holbrook and McFaul sends a chill through their veins and paralyzes their brains?  If the Kremlin really believes that it won’t be able to work with Obama, then something is wrong with the Kremlin, not Obama.

Putting it mildly, I’m not a young man, and my life plans are becoming less strategic and more tactical with every passing year.  But I have children, who will be living in this country long after I’m gone.  Both of them will be voting for president for the first time and both – my son who’s inherited my cynical attitude towards politics and politicians, and my daughter, who still believes that the world can be helped by proper community work (my wife’s genes) – are enthusiastic Obama fans.

This year, I’m going to vote for Barack Obama to let my kids know that I share their belief that this country can be changed for the better.  I’m going to vote for Barack Obama and, if he’s elected, will make sure – to the extent that an ordinary citizen like me can do that – that this guy will fulfill each of the many promises of change that over the period of the past 18 months, he has thrown at me and them.

That’s why this year, my vote counts.  To me.

I’m Eugene Ivanov, and I’ve approved this message.

The End Of Biography: John McCain's Last And, Hopefully, Unsuccessful Run For Presidency

Only an incorrigible optimist can find a silver lining in the ongoing financial crisis engulfing the United States and the rest of the world.  Yet, if there is one, it is that the gloomy prospects for the American economy will most likely put an end to Sen. John McCain's bid to become the 44th president of the United States.

His rival, Sen. Barack Obama, often charges that McCain's presidency will bring four more years of Bush's.  Here, Obama gets it wrong.  Bush's blunders notwithstanding,  his policies have been driven by Bush's vision, however mistaken, of the country's future ("compassionate conservatism" in domestic politics and "democracy promotion" in foreign affairs).

McCain is different, for he hasn't articulated any comprehensive, forward-looking, political philosophy at all.  McCain is a man of the past, and his insistence on "experience" is a subconscious admission that his mind belongs to the times long gone.  His repeated references to the K.G.B. (disbanded in 1995) and Czechoslovakia (ceased to exist as a state in 1992) aren't just memory lapses, forgivable for a 72-year-old.  Rather, they are bold statements that McCain sees the world not as it is, but as he chooses to remember it.

At the center of McCain's world is the Vietnam War.  McCain loves wars in which America fights ("to love your country is to fight for it") and he divides them into those that have been won --  with troops coming home "with honor" -- and those that could have been won had not defeat been snatched from the jaw of victory.

This explains McCain's nervous, almost hysterical, reaction to the results of the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia.  True, McCain has a special feeling towards Georgia, due to his warm personal relationship with Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, and to the fact that his foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann, had received millions from the Georgian government.  But what has set McCain completely off was that the victory -- Georgia's Membership Action Plan for NATO -- was brutally snatched from McCain hands when he could already palpate it. 

(He looked around and, predictably enough, saw three letters: K. G and B.)

Everyone agrees that McCain's five-and-half-year imprisonment in Vietnam has had profound effects on his political views, temperament, and behavior.  He went to Vietnam to fight Communism and lost.   And since then, he's had scores to settle.  

(In a sense, McCain has never left his prison cell.  He is still a prisoner.  A prisoner of the Cold War.) 

I leave it to psychoanalysts to decide whether McCain's trademark outbursts of anger come from his genes, his years in prison, or both.  Yet, it is utterly unsettling to have a potential Commander-in-Chief calling -- during an argument on the Senate floor -- another Senator "a fucking jerk."  Or, calling his wife, Cindy, a "cunt" in front of other people. 

(This begs, I guess, the larger question of whether people who had spent long time in prison, are fit to become heads of states.  There is no reason, of course, to compare McCain to Zviad Gamsakhurdia.  But Nelson Mandela he is not.  Not even Vaclav Havel.) 

McCain's current presidential run repeats the major theme of his life.  He ran in 2000 and was humiliatingly defeated in the primaries by whom he called back then "agents of intolerance", the religious conservative wing of the Republican party.  And since then, he's had scores to settle.   

He is not running to promote any particular ideological agenda -- as Bush was and Obama is -- for he's got none.  He's running to get even with people who stopped him eight years ago.  His selection of Alaskan governor, Sarah Palin-- inexperienced and immature populist --  as his running mate is a clear indication that McCain's goal is to get elected at whatever cost.  The very thought of what may happen come January 21, 2009 doesn't appear to have descended upon him.   

(McCain's choice of Palin shows that he shares Vladimir Lenin's belief that under right circumstances, every kitchenmade ("kukharka") can "run the state."  Just put expensive lipstick on her.) 

McCain likes to highlight his patriotism by saying that he'd rather lose the election, but win the war.  Well, lose the election he most likely will, and it'll be up to President Obama to win all the wars McCain has helped to start.

But I'm not sorry for John McCain.  He has enough wars to fight in his head.  He'll be busy for the rest of his life.

The Party Goes On

Pushing the war with Georgia and the financial crisis aside, the Russian political beau monde went into the business of ... well, politicking.  The month of October may see a record number of political parties ceasing to exist. 

In a few days, an emergency congress of the Agrarian Party of Russia will approve its leadership's decision to merge with United Russia.  This merger isn't about ideology (as if United Russia has one), for, ideologically, the Agrarians are much closer to the Communists.  But they also have a constituency: large, mostly state-owned, agricultural businesses, whose interests will be better represented from within the "party of power."

The timing of the merger, announced shortly after Russia had effectively terminated its bid to join the WTO, is hardly coincidental.  Quotes for agricultural imports have been a major sticking point in Russia's negotiations with the WTO.  Staying outside the WTO is highly beneficial to domestic food producers, and the Agrarians' decision to join ranks with the edinorosses was their way of saying thank you.

Although the Agrarians seem to benefit most from the deal, United Russia is also getting something in return.  The Agrarian Party is a force to be reckoned with in a number of Central Russia's regions.  The merger will solidify United Russia's standing there -- obviously, at the expense of its major competitor, the Communist Party.

There is one more reason why the Agrarians are about to surrender their independence, and it has nothing to do with ideology, either.  Each political party that gained less than 3% of the vote in the 2007 Duma election has to ultimately pay for using free media time during the course of the election campaign.  The debt, which must be repaid by the beginning of December, is usually running up to 150-180 million rubles ($6-7M).  One way of not paying the money, which most of the small parties have no means of doing anyway, is to "disappear" as a political party: either by "downgrading" to the status of "public movement" or by merging with other parties.

This seems to be exactly the reason why the small  Party of Social Justice is going to follow the Agrarians' suit by merging into one of the four Duma parties, Just Russia.

Last week, the theater of absurd that the world of Russia's domestic politics has become, produced a fresh episode of the never-ending soap opera "Russian liberals, unite!"  In a bizarre twist of events, the script of the last episode is rumored to have been written by the Kremlin.

First, the Political Council of the Union of Right Forces(SPS) has voted to disband the party.  Shortly, it was announced that in a process reportedly promoted by the presidential administration,  SPS will become part of a new "liberal" project composed also of two political dwarfs, the Democratic Party of Russia and Civil Force. 

The dissolution of SPS is a logical outcome for the organization that has finally collapsed under the burden of internal squabbling and indiscriminate prostituting of its own principles.  But why would the Kremlin want to keep afloat a bunch of "me too" political amateurs from the DPR and CF?

Russia isn't short of professional politicians with liberal views and experience in real governance.  The Krasnoyarsk region's governor, Alexander Khloponin, and Duma deputies, Vladislav Reznik and Vladimir Pligin, immediately spring to mind.  If the Kremlin is serious about creating a viable liberal party, these folks should be allowed to leave United Russia and form a new structure (as they wanted a few years ago).

On the other hand, will United Russia survive being deprived of the few bright minds it has?... 

Meanwhile, defying the notion that Russia's political business is all about M&A, one IPO has also been announced.  Former Soviet Union President, Mikhail Gorbachev, and banker Alexander Lebedev, have made public their plan to create a new social-democratic party.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev is a good man.  His energy, passion for new projects, and desire to stay relevant are amazing, given his age (Gorbachev is 77).  It's just too bad that his time has gone, but I'm not going to tell him that.  Quite to the contrary, I wish Mikhail Sergeevich all the best in this new endeavor.

Alexander Lebedev is a somewhat different story.  His interest in promoting ideas of social democracy isn't obvious.  What is obvious is Lebedev's desire to become Mayor of Moscow (in 2003, he ran against Luzhkov and lost).  To buttress his political resume, in 2003, Lebedev became Duma deputy on the Rodina ticket.  When Rodina fell out with the Kremlin, he bolted and joined United Russia.  Having realized that the United Russia membership won't help him to unseat Luzhkov, Lebedev left United Russia and eventually joined Just Russia.

Is it too cynical to interpret Lebedev's latest move as a maneuvering before another shot at the mayorship?  The timing is telling, given that Luzhkov's term expires in December.

On the other hand, if Lebedev is cheating us, he's doing that with his own money.

September Swan Songs

The month of September has been rich in public speeches of politicians whose tenures in office are in their twilight.  Not all of these swan songs turned out to be as beautiful as the one attributed to the legendary Mute Swan.   

Last week, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, delivered a speech on U.S.-Russia relations.  Given how little time she has left in office -- and the speed with which she's losing relevance -- this "Russian" speech may well become her last major public address. 

I feel sorry for Condi for having had to deliver the speech: she has absolutely nothing new or meaningful to say.  But the administration wanted to vent out frustration with Russia, and poor Condi had to go through a dull laundry list of Russia's  perceived misdeeds: freedom rollback, gas blackmail, media intimidation, etc.  

Interestingly, at the end, she was asked a question about Iraq and had to conclude her presentation with defending  the administration's decision to invade the country.  How fitting!  No matter where she goes or talks about, Rice will go down in history as one of the architects, enablers, and cheerleaders of the disastrous Iraq war.  

A few days later, Rice's boss, President Bush, flew to New York City to deliver his farewell address to the United Nations General Assembly.  In contrast to Rice, who spoke to a friendly audience of the German Marshall Fund, Bush was facing a much more incredulous, and perhaps even hostile, crowd.

And this is too bad, because Bush delivered quite a decent (by his own standards) speech.  He spoke about fighting terrorism ("a global movement of violent extremists", in his words) and epidemic diseases in Africa.  Moreover, know for his disdain for international institutions and treaties, Bush displayed a rare sign of support of "multilateralism": "The United Nations and other multilateral organizations are needed more urgently than ever."  

The problem was that no one seemed to care what Bush had to say about terrorism.  Everyone was waiting for his comments on the ongoing financial crisis in the United States.  And Bush finally delivered: "In recent weeks, we have taken bold steps to prevent a severe disruption of the American economy, which would have a devastating effect on other economies around the world."  (The fact that by "bold steps" Bush meant a de facto nationalization of private companies, deserves a separate discussion).  How fitting it was -- again! -- that the president whose fighting of terrorism has been a hallmark of his presidency, had to explain to the whole world how he was going to clean up the financial mess his administration had so effectively contributed to.  

Later, at the U.N. General Assembly lectern, Bush was followed by the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  In seven months, Ahmadinejad will be facing re-election, and the rumors are that he's unlikely to win the second term.  So his address to the General Assembly might well have been his swan song on the international stage.  

(Upon arriving in New York City, Ahmadinejad gave an interview to NPR.  NPR is currently in the middle of the fall fund-raising campaign and is promising to its listeners "an intelligent and balanced analysis."  Ahmadinejad's interviewer, Steve Inskeep, has shown none of the above.  Instead, his interview was a combination of incompetence, arrogance, cheap gotcha journalism, and sheer rudeness towards his guest.  Those who're really interested in Ahmadinejad's views, would rather read his interview with The New York Times.) 

Ahmadinejad's General Assembly talk was a peculiar mix of references to "the Compassionate, the Merciful God", tough criticism of "a few bullying powers", insistence on "the inalienable right of ... the Iranian nation in producing nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes", and promises of "a global community filled with justice, friendship, brotherhood and welfare" as foreseen "by great divine Prophets Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus Christ and Mohammad."

In the meantime, as the Washington Post reported yesterday:

"The United States, Russia, China, and key European powers agreed Friday to press for a U.N. Security Council resolution that renews previous demands for Iran to halt its enrichment of uranium but includes no new punitive measures to compel Tehran to do so. "

In his speech, Ahmadinejad gave no indication that he anticipated such an outcome.  Did he?  I'm sure he did.

Another world celebrity, Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, addressed the General Assembly on September 23.  Saakashvili was re-elected for his second term at the beginning of the year and, in theory, has three more opportunities to speak to the world forum.  However, given his humiliating defeat in the Five-Day War with Russia, his presidency may be approaching the twilight faster than Georgia's constitution would predict.

Was this speech in New York City his swan song? 

The End Of Geography: Russia Is Looking For A Place In Multipolar World

I'm not sure whether the current inhabitants of the Kremlin have time to read books and, if they do, whether they've had a chance to read Fareed Zakharia's latest, "The Post-American World."  But I suspect that they're aware of the term "post-Americanism."  And I'm certain that the folks in the Kremlin have heard about the report, "Global Trends 2025", prepared for the next U.S. president by the U.S. intelligence community.

As described last week by the Washington Post,  the report predicts "a steady decline in U.S. dominance in the coming decades."  Taking place "at an accelerating pace", the decline spreads over "political, economic and arguably, cultural arenas."  Even the traditional U.S. superiority in military power won't stop the slide, because, report argues, "nobody is going to attack us with massive conventional force." 

The U.S. reaction to the results of the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia appears to be the first tangible sign of the United States entering the "post-American" era.  

For years, the U.S. has been providing Georgia with military assistance, while pretending in the meantime that it didn't suspect how these newly-acquired military capacities will be used.  For all these years, it has been explicitly understood that the Saakashvili regime in Tbilisi had the full backing of Washington. 

Yet, when responding to Georgia's assault on South Ossetia on August 7th, Russian troops routed the Georgian army, the White House immediately made it clear that it was't going to defend its defeated client militarily.  And then, the United States has moved to the sidelines and abdicated all the responsibility for the political resolution of the conflict  in favor of the "resurgent" (diplomatically speaking) France.

David Ignatius of the Post has hailed the U.S. post-war response as a triumph of "caution over confrontation."  Hmm, there seem to be different ways of describing "post-Americanism"...

As far as Russia is concerned, the major task now facing its leadership is to find Russia's place in the emerging "post-American", multipolar world. 

What makes this task nontrivial is the fact that -- as the war with Georgia has clearly demonstrated -- Russia has very few, if any, real friends around the world.

For years, Russian political elites believed that they could leverage Russia's supposedly warm relations with China in their dialogue with the West.  Yet China's reaction to Russia's actions in Georgia has turned out to be somewhat between lukewarm and openly hostile.  The recent decision of the Asian Development Bank to approve a low-interest $40 million loan to Georgia suggests that such a sentiment might be prevailing over the whole Asian continent.

True, it's quite conceivable that privately, Chinese leaders sound more accommodating than in public.  However, it should be obvious to the Kremlin that "friendship" with China won't come cheap. 

A lesson that Russia would be wise to learn in the wake of the war is that the "West" -- a unified force during the Cold War -- doesn't exist anymore.  In the multipolar world Russia is so craving for, the "West" consists of the United States, Western ("Old"), and Central/Eastern ("New") Europe. 

Russian relations with the U.S. have hit rock bottom and will stay there for at least a year, until the next administration in Washington has time to go through a long list of urgent issues.  President Medvedev should use this "strategic pause" to compose a list of favors he could do for the next American president and, yes, a list of tough responses Russia would take should it feel that its interests are threatened or underappreciated. 

Medvedev is a more mature politician than either Obama or McCain, and it'll be up to him to set up an agenda for the future U.S.-Russian cooperation.  The "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration", a document signed by Bush and Putin in Sochi in April, is a great place to start.  

I've said it before and can only repeat: strategic partnership between United States and Russia has no geopolitical alternatives.

Russia should turn down the rhetoric against its critics in Eastern and Central Europe, especially Poland and the Baltic countries.  No matter what their leaders are saying, they've learned their lessons of the Five-Day War, too.  There is no reason to antagonize them beyond limits.

Finally, the Russian leadership should realize that the major, if not the only, reason why Russia wasn't further isolated or even sanctioned is its 233-billion-euro trade with the EU, the bulk of which is falling on Germany, Italy, and France.  Given that 57 percent of Russia's import and one third of investments in Russia come from Europe, Russia's future European policy can be formulated in three short sentences:

Reward Germany.  Reward Italy.  Reward France.

 

 

 

War Chronicles

As a regular reader of the Washington Post, I'm used to the paper's hostile attitude towards Russia.  The Post's biased coverage of the recent conflict in the Caucasus thus hasn't come as a surprise.

What was somewhat surprising, though, was the level of the Post's attention to the topic: between August 9 and September 2, the Post has published a whopping 37 editorials and op-eds (and I might have missed some) -- not to mention regular reports from on-the-ground.

The usual suspects like Anne Applebaum and Charles Krauthammer have put in their two cents.  The Victim-in-Chief, Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, has warned on August 14 that Georgia's defeat in the conflict would be "the death knell for the spread of freedom and democracy everywhere."  World luminaries have made their royal appearances.  French president Nicolas Sarkozy hailed his diplomatic prowess, whereas the president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, struggled to decide who he was more: a statesman or Saakashvili's buddy.  Legendary Francis Fukuyama has reminded that the end of history was still upon us.  Mikhail Gorbachev and the Nixon Center's Paul Saunders have cast rare votes of reason and common sense.

The Post's editors haven't spent much time on figuring out what actually happened in South Ossetia on August 8.  While pundits were meticulously reconstructing the timeline of the events in the war zone, the Post immediately proceeded to the perennial Russian question: "Who is to be blamed?"  The answer was obvious. 

An August 9 editorial headlined "Stopping Russia.  The United States and its allies must unite against Moscow's war on Georgia" didn't even mention the fact that scores of innocent civilians have been massacred by Georgian troops.  The editorial went straight to business: “Georgia’s democratically elected government has accepted U.S. military and economic aid, supported the mission in Iraq and pursued NATO membership.”  That was enough for the Post to justify that “the United States and its NATO allies must impose a price on Russia."

(The lack of curiosity about events on the ground seems to reflect the newspaper's standard policy. Writing for it on August 11, Ronald Asmus and Richard Holbrooke opined: “Exactly what happened in South Ossetia last week is unclear.” Robert Kagan went a step further: “The details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not very important.”)  

The only sign of the diversity of opinions allowed by the Post's authors was whether the condemnation of Russia was unconditional (George Will: "Russia's aggression is really about the subordination of Georgia, a democratic, market-oriented U.S. ally."  Harold Meyerson: "The invasion of Georgia was a chilling display of Russia's brutal force.") or accompanied by a timid attempt to scrutinize Russia's actions (Richard Cohen: "... the Caucasus is Russia's Latin America -- a sphere of influence asserted by its own version of the Monroe Doctrine."  Strobe Talbott: "... it's payback time for a grievance that Russia has borne against the West for nine years.").  Some restless minds went as far as to acknowledge that the other side bore some responsibility, too (Michael Dobbs: "... the behavior of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has been erratic and provocative").

Having easily disposed of the question "Who is to be blamed?", the Post has moved to another perennial Russian question: "What is to be done?"

Charles Krauthammer was the first to come up with a comprehensive list of "sanctions" against Putin.  (This isn't a typo: in his piece titled "How to Stop Putin", Krauthammer uses "Putin" and "Russia" interchangeably.  Here is a quote: "What is to be done?  Let's be real.  There's nothing to be done militarily.  What we can do is alter Putin's cost-benefit calculations.")  The list included suspension of the NATO-Russia Council, barring Russia's entry to the WTO, "dissolving" the G-8 (and a "reconstitution of the original G-7" without Russia), and a U.S. boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. 

In my previous post, I argued already that the proposed "measures" are unlikely to succeed, and  my reservations happen to be shared by some at the Post (William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz: "Threatening to withdraw support for Russia's hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi would divide the West and probably fail").   

Having come to terms with the fact that "the West" has very limited diplomatic -- and no military -- leverage over Russia, the Post has turned to the idea of punishing the Kremlin by using "soft power."  First hinted at in an August 26 editorial, this idea was fully articulated in the next day's piece -- by David Rivkin and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky -- tastefully titled "Target the Kremlin Pocketbooks."  

Rivkin and Ramos-Mrosovsky call on U.S. and E.U regulators to examine "the business transactions of people close to Putin's regime for money laundering or for securities, tax and other economic irregularities."  And, in the case when "irregularities" are found, use "subpoenas, indictments, asset forfeitures ... and travel restrictions" to punish the "Chekist oligarchs" (as the authors prefer to call Russian businessmen).

Rivkin and Ramos-Mrosovsky provide no evidence that the alleged "irregularities" are widespread enough -- or are even taking place at all -- to justify the proposed witchhunt.  Nor do they consider the legality and the potential cost of the future "investigations" -- a somewhat puzzling fact given that both are lawyers.  But what makes their views border insanity is the declared objective of the "soft power" harassment. Rivkin and Ramos-Mrosovsky believe that "[I]f enough pain is inflicted on them [Russia's governing elites], they will ... seek to replace Putin as the power behind the throne."  Wow!

It took the cool head and un-Post wisdom of David Ignatius to tell his readers something that every responsible political writer in the U.S. -- even a Post contributor -- must know: "American leaders shouldn't make threats the country can't deliver or promises it isn't prepared to keep.  The rhetoric of confrontation may make us feel good, but other people end up getting killed." 

"The rhetoric of confrontation may make us feel good, but other people end up getting killed."

Asymmetric Response

Don't get me wrong: I'm not nostalgic for the Cold War.  Yet, would you agree that there was a certain beauty in the symmetry of the Cold War world? Two superpowers, locked in the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) embrace, exchanged equally painful, perfectly "symmetric", blows: eye for eye, tit for tat, yin for yang.

Then the Soviet Union was gone, the bipolar world gave way to unipolar -- with the United States remaining the only superpower -- and with the new arrangement came what is called "asymmetric response."  It is what an offended party, unable to prevent a hostile action against it, launches to make the cost of the offense too high (for the offender) to accept.

Russia considers two developments -- the U.S. deployment of elements of missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic and acceptance of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO -- as the major threats to its national security. 

Its reaction to the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the United States and Poland bears all the hallmarks of asymmetric response: unable to thwart the deployment 0f 10 interceptors in Poland, Russia has promised to target them with nuclear weapons.

Russia's military offense against Georgia -- in retaliation to Georgia's aggression in South Ossetia -- carries elements of asymmetric response, too.  By destroying Georgia's military installations and recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- causing a de facto partition of the country -- Russia has made Georgia's once seemingly unavoidable accession to NATO all but a joke. 

But there is much more to Russia's actions.  The key to understanding its position in the conflict lies in the statement that President Medvedev made on August 8, the very day Georgia’s military assault on the citizens of South Ossetia began.  Addressing a meeting of his Security Council, Medvedev has said: “Russia always was and will ever remain the guarantor of security in the Caucasus.”  Viewing all the following events in the context of this statement,  Russia's deliberate use of overwhelming military force against Georgia -- its first outside Russian borders in post-Soviet history -- is a perfectly symmetric, superpower-style response to what Russia justifiably considers as a threat to its strategic national interests.   

Ironically, it's the United States that has failed to meet Russia's bold moves head-on and is now frantically scrambling to find whatever available asymmetric responses it has.  Expelling Russia from the G8 group of industrialized countries, severing the Russia-NATO cooperation, and preventing Russia's acceptance to the WTO are the measures that are most frequently discussed.

The idea of throwing Russia out of the G8 is hardly new and is especially popular in the U.S., while other members of the group, in particular, Europeans are rather lukewarm, if not outright opposed, to the idea.  True, the exclusion of Russia from the G8 will inflict some pain on the Kremlin, whose hosts are very sensitive to Russia's image as a "great power."  Even a month ago, such a move would have been a tremendous humiliation to Medvedev.  But much less so today, as the domestic audience will consider this as no more than  a "punishment" for the right cause.  The Kremlin propaganda machine will easily convert the "G8-minus-Russia" black spot into a badge of honor.

Already, a deputy from the United Russia faction sitting on the Duma International Affair Committee opined that Russia's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might be more important and even more prestigious than its participation in the G8.

I fail to understand why so many pundits believe that Russia -- as a country-- really wants to join the WTO.  In reality, the whole WTO thing is driven by only a bunch of liberally-minded politicians eager to promote Russia's economic cooperation with the West.  (And their stock has been in a downfall lately).  The only real reason why Russia is still not a part of the WTO is the energetic and skillful opposition of the powerful agribusiness lobby.

Prime Minister Putin's recent statement that Russia "should abandon some of the commitments it made during World Trade Organization accession talks" has sent waves of joy through certain corners of the Russian government.  A prominent member of the lobby, Federation Council's member Sergei Lisovsky, has called Russia's WTO chief negotiator, Maxim Medvedev, the "enemy of the people" and suggested that Medvedev should be "imprisoned."  Lisovsky went further and demanded that the 2005 agreement encouraging U.S. poultry exports in Russia be immediately scrapped. 

Will Russia be hurt by denying its accession to the WTO?  Just ask the folks at Tyson Foods. 

Proponents of Russia-NATO cooperation will be hard pressed to point to a single tangible result of this uneasy relation, and it is unlikely that any side will suffer from its suspension.  I'm not a military expert and cannot say to which extent  the cancellation of FRUKUS-2008 will dent the readiness of the U.S. and Russian fleets.  What I do know is that it's good for the environment in the Japanese Sea. 

The only possible victim of freezing Russia-NATO relations could be Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian Ambassador to NATO.  Rogozin just settled in Brussels less than a year ago, and now, he may be forced to update his resume again.  Should President Medvedev continue harassing Georgia's leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, he could send Rogozin as Russia's Ambassador to Tbilisi.

I know, such response to Saakashvili's arrogance will be "brutal" and "disproportional."  I'm not sure whether it's symmetric or asymmetric.